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Abstract
This article examines the relationship between globalization and national
education reforms, especially those of educational systems. Instead of exploring
the much debated issues of how globalization affects national educational systems
and how the nations react by what kinds of systemic education reform, however,
it focuses on what such a method often leaves out – the internal conditions of a
nation that facilitates or hampers reform efforts. Taking South Korea as an
example, it explores that country’s unique national context which restricts and
even inhibits education reforms. Especially noted here is the established “statist”
political economy in education. In the paper’s analysis, although South Korea’s
statist political economy has made a substantial contribution to economic and
educational development, it is now considered increasingly unviable as
globalization progresses. Nevertheless, the internal conditions, resultant from the
previous statist policies, set limits on policy makers’ efforts to alter the existing
educational system. The analysis suggests that a fuller assessment of
globalization’s impact upon national educational systems or their reforms
requires a perspective which is broad enough to encompass not only the concepts
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and/or theories of globalization and nation states but also the power relations and
ideological setup of individual nations.
I begin by exploring the meaning of globalization and pointing out the need to
consider individual nations’ internal conditions. Focusing on South Korea, then, I identify a
statist political economy that is in place and the policy making venues it implicates. Then, the
analysis moves on to identify the statist educational policies employed during the developmental
years of military dictatorship and the structural educational problems resulted from such
policies. This is followed by an examination of the educational reform agendas of liberalization
and diversification that emerged at a time of globalization and civilian democracy, and of the way
in which the country’s internal conditions obstructed reform efforts. I conclude by suggesting
that, in spite of such negative functions, the internal conditions will eventually be altered as
statism becomes increasingly unviable under the forces of globalization.

Globalization and the Internal Conditions of Nations
A salient theme of the globalization discourse concerns the emergence of transnational
capital—financial and industrial capital which freely “roams around the world in search of
profits and efficient production sites” (Fudge and Glasbeek 1997, 219). According to Cox (1993,
259-60), globalization exhibits “two principal aspects.” One is the global organizations of
production involving complex transnational networks of production, which take advantage of
costs, markets, taxes, and access to suitable labor as well as political security and predictability.
The other principal aspect is global finance, which involves a very large unregulated system of
transactions in money, credit, and equities. These aspects of globalization are also, in his view,
the principal aspects of the global economy which follows globalization and, in operation,
transcends national boundaries, thus reducing the nation state’s autonomy and demanding that
national economies be adjusted to its own exigencies (Ibid.; Ohmae 1993; Gummet 1996).
Further, the integration of domestic economies into the global economy places the nation states
under “insecurity” (Ratinoff 1995, 147) notably of revenues which generate financial resources
for governing and protecting domestic activity. While state revenues depend on the nation’s
economic performances, the latter now rely on the transnational behavior of the global economy.
The nation state, it follows, has not only to conform to the global economy but also to reduce its
domestic role to an affordable level. If so, then, public education, which has been expanding at
the time of the state’s ever-increasing commitment, may no longer do so. Rather, it may have to
go through a restructuring process involving such policies as liberalization, decentralization and
privatization.
The globalization discourse also involves another theme, that globalization is related not only
to transnational capital and the global economy but also to other factors, notably global “cultural
forces” that affect national educational systems (Mazrui 1990; UNESCO 1998) and prompt
transformations and transitions (Mebrahtu et al. 2000). Included in such forces, and noted
among them, are information and communication technology (ICT) and the innovative
processes it foments (Carnoy 1999; Nelson-Richards 2003). In this theme, a nation’s economic
prosperity depends on its performance in the global economy, which, in turn, relies on the
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workforce’s adjustment to, and leadership in, the knowledge-intensive mode of production
buttressed by ICT. Of importance for this is to have “a workforce that has the foundation to
enhance the quality and efficiency of product development, production and maintenance, and
the flexibility to acquire the new skills required for new jobs” and “a cadre of highly-trained
scientific, technical and processing personnel” (Haddad 1997, 37). The former requires solid
primary and secondary education while the latter calls for quality higher education. These
requirements can be met by increased state investment in education and a reinforced national
educational system. In this theme, thus, the state has to enhance its role in education.
The two conflicting themes have generated different responses regarding the impact
of globalization on national educational systems. One such response is found often in the works
by those who are outside the field of education. It speaks of public education’s continuity at a
time of crisis and points to the necessity of restructuring national educational systems in order to
make them cost-effective, decentralized, market-friendly, and viable in the new environment
(World Bank 1995; Burnett and Patrionos 1997; Popkewitz 2000; Daun 2002; Mok and Chan
2002). The second response, which is prominent in the works of those within the education field,
runs in the opposite direction. It defends state commitment to education for equity and justice
and denounces the more or less harmful effects of globalization, for instance, on the educational
systems of Third World countries (Pannu 1996) or in advanced industrial nations such as Canada
(O’Sullivan 1999), on the worse-offs in public schools in comparison with the better-offs in
private schools (Espinola 1992; Reynolds and Griffiths 2002), on neglected primary and
secondary education in comparison with favored higher education (e.g., Samoff 1994), on
tensions between global and local dynamics in culture and education (Burbules and Torres 2000;
Stromquist and Monkman 2000; Torres 2002), on the need of resistance to globalization
(McLaren and Farahmandpur 2001), and so on. To be fair, these responses are both empirical
and moralistic, empirical because they draw upon facts collected from individual nations and
moralistic because they are disposed to condone or condemn globalization.
A third response is more moralistic than empirical. It denies both of the above-mentioned
themes and demands that nation states increase their commitment to education because
globalization elevates, and does not lower, their status, allegedly, as is evident in East Asian
countries (Green 1997; Green 1999). Meanwhile, a fourth response, which is more empirical
than moralistic, states that globalization has rendered “little effects” to national educational
systems (McGinn 1997).
Such diverse responses, however, commonly leave out one area which is important for
a fuller account of the relationship between globalization and national educational systems. This
area is actually hinted at in the fourth cited response, in which decentralization confronts
resistance from “conservative” teachers, parents and local actors who do not want changes to
the status quo (Ibid.). Education reforms are initiated and pursued by those who recognize the
necessity of change. More often than not, however, their policy agendas and ideas are not
finalized as policies straightforwardly. In the policy making processes, such agendas and ideas
confront opposing agendas and views, and are compromised, revised and even discarded to the
good or bad. For this reason, what is observed in state education policies, school statistics,
changes or no changes to national educational systems, shows the outcome of the negotiations
and compromises which have taken place in a relatively short time span. It does not readily
reveal the kind of impact of globalization that is now canceled out by opposing forces but will
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resurrect later on when the opposing forces recede.
Important to consider in this light is the internal conditions which play a crucial role in
the policy making and implementation processes, especially the state’s established political
economy which is institutionalized in state-society, state-education relationships. In their
application to individual nations, globalization-triggered reform measures—such as
liberalization, decentralization and privatization—confront the state’s established way of dealing
with societal and educational matters. If the established way is one of relatively open and
permissive of freedom of activity in society and education, such measures may be applied with
relative ease. If not, however, it may not. The reason is that the reform measures are, in this case,
more than mere reform measures: they aim to alter the established political economy itself. If a
state’s established political economy is closed and not permissive of freedom in society and
education, therefore, such measures are either unlikely to be employed or to be employed
superficially as if nothing has happened in spite of globalization, or even as if the nation state has
enhanced its status due to globalization as Green (1997; 1999) mistakes.
Here, it is interesting to examine how South Korea’s established political economy
influences policy making and implementation in education. It is so because the country’s
“statist” political economy has created internal conditions that are not susceptible to
globalization but, rather, inhibits changes to existing state-society, state-education relationships.

Statist Political Economy and Its Policy Making Process
Statism as a Political Economy Concept
Statism is a concept of political economy which denotes a peculiar way in which the
political state deals with the economic activity of individuals and groups in the civil sphere (or
“civil society” or “society”).1 In the statist political economy, roughly, the state subjugates the
interest of individuals or groups to its own interest or the interest of the nation (or society at
large). However, statism in this rough sense is too broad to be useful as an analytic tool, for any
intervention by the state in civil matters can be seen as the subjugation of individual or group
interest to the state’s own interest. In fact, all modern states intervene in civil matters in one way
or another, so all of them can be “statist” as the libertarians would claim. Statism in such a broad
sense proffers no help to distinguishing a state’s way of dealing with civil matters from another
state’s. To be a useful analytic tool, it needs circumscription against the concrete context of
specific countries.
Statism, as it is found in South Korea is, generally, a legacy of Japan’s colonial rule,
1910-1945, and Japan, in turn, imported it from Prussia. Therefore, statism in South Korea
shares certain general features with those in Japan and, indirectly, in Prussia (and also with other
East Asian countries which employ the “Japanese model of market economics” [Sakakibara
1993], such as Taiwan and, arguably, China). An important common feature of this type of
statism is that the state maintains big power, bureaucracy and institutional networks by which to
control and manage the activity of civil society in order to make “the nation wealthy and its
military strong” (fukoku kyohei; pugug kangbyong) as proclaimed in the past, or to promote
“economic development” and “social well-being” as emphasized more recently. State
intervention in society in South Korea and Japan is so extensive and intensive that its influence is
felt at all tissues of social fabric, so much so that it is often questioned whether these countries
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really have a “civil society” in the sense of a collectivity of self-seeking individuals (see McVeigh
1998). In Prussia, as well, the individuality of a person was considered—for instance, in the
works of Hegel—in reference to the totality of the state.
On the contemporary scene, however, statism in Japan and South Korea shows
different features from what remains in Germany. While Germany’s political economy is often
characterized by social partnership and corporatism, such characteristics are not visible in those
two countries. Policy making and implementation in Japan is a process in which the state
unilaterally decides for society according to its own agendas (Schoppa 1991). The state does not
seek public consultation or consultation with the parties to be affected by the policies under
consideration except through some nominal procedures. Policy negotiations and compromises
occur within the governing circle, involving government leaders, the ruling political party and
state bureaucrats, in the manner of “patterned pluralism” (Muramatsu and Krauss 1987, 543).
Particularly noteworthy here is the bureaucrats’ prominent status. According to Schoppa, the
Liberal Democrats’ long one-party domination allowed the bureaucrats to accumulate power to
the extent that, in the mid-1980s, they successfully thwarted government leaders’ efforts to
liberalize the overly state-controlled educational system in order to better cope with
globalization.2
The state’s unilateral process of policy making and imposition is conspicuous also in
South Korea.3 But the roles of political parties and the bureaucrats in the process are not as
powerful as they are in Japan. Whilst in Japan the long domination by the elected Liberal
Democrats did not generate serious issues about the legitimacy of power, South Korea’s military
dictatorship did so. General Pag Chong Hi’s government was installed after the 1961 coup and
ended in 1979 upon his assassination. Then, Generals Chon Du Hoan and Ro Tae U usurped
power through a multi-stage coup completed with the Kwangju massacre of 200 protestors, and
took turn to rule the country until 1993. During the three decades, the military elite confronted
repeated challenges to the legitimacy of their power. In response, they tightly controlled the
population and employed the state bureaucracy as an instrument for this. And in order to secure
the efficiency of this instrument, they meticulously prevented the bureaucrats from acquiring
prerogatives in their respective fields.4 Although the military elite had political parties for the
legislature, as well, such parties were not permitted to air independent voices. As a result, the
state-society relationship established during the military years was characteristic in that the state
tightly controlled—or at least tried to control—the population, and the bureaucrats and political
parties remained subservient.
Venues to Policy Making
A unique policy making process emerged from this state-society relationship. The
military elite’s principal concern in handling the persistent legitimacy crisis was the maintenance
and legitimation of their power. They addressed this concern through a few typical venues to
policy making. The first and foremost venue was, of course, the control of civilian activity, the
suppression of resistance by means of the state apparatus, and the justification of such policies
by pointing to the constantly “imminent” North Korean invasion. This venue, however,
promised only short-term benefits; in the long run, it was detrimental rather than beneficial
because it invited further resistance. The long-term security of power had to be sought for
through another venue: a “mobilization strategy” (Brown 1998) with which to draw the
unsupportive population to their side and thus legitimate their power. For this strategy, Pag’s
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military junta in 1961 put forward a project of legitimation by economic development (or
developmental legitimation) and all successive military governments adhered to this project
albeit with modifications. The gist of this project was the messages to the population that
everyone would have a fair share of the fruits once development became reality, and that the
military elite who offered such a great promise were far greater than the “corrupt and
incompetent” civilian leaders.
This second policy making venue, however, contravened the first venue. The junta’s
developmental legitimation project was one of planned economic development. The state
configured the final outcome of development, set necessary developmental tasks for
intermediary stages, and tried to meet such tasks by allocating resources and opportunities to
strategic industries and economic actors in order thus to boost their performances. This
approach alienated non-strategic industries and actors and entailed the latter’s discontent and the
egalitarian outcry for equality, equal opportunity, social justice, and so on. The 1961 junta’s
reaction, and the reactions of subsequent military regimes, took two routes. In one route, it
suppressed the display of discontent and open discussions on the egalitarian issues; in the other,
it employed “egalitarian policy measures” (Lee CJ 1980) for a temporary mollification of the
discontent. Such policy measures, however, aimed mostly at short-term effects in limited areas
and did not address the problem directly. Even so, however, such measures conflicted with, and
hampered, the developmental legitimation project. For example, the military government
forbade and suppressed labor activity in favor of the manufacturer’s capital accumulation but, at
the same time, it enforced price control, especially of daily necessities, in order to ease the
underpaid workers’ troubles, in effect, restricting capital accumulation.
The developmental legitimation project was impeded also by a third policy making
venue. Although the project was useful for the mobilization strategy, it was by nature a call for
support in reference to a remote, uncertain future. The present legitimacy crisis required
immediately effective means. For this, the military elite took advantage of the traditional
“personalist ethic,”5 in which transactions were made through personal connections rather than
through open competition. In this ethic, the military governments allocated strategic resources
and opportunities through personal connections bridged by common regions of origin, alumni
relationships, military camaraderies, as well as the personal knots bonded by bribery. This venue
led to a considerable success because powerful support groups indeed emerged in various
sectors, for example, chaebol groups (or business conglomerates) in raising irregular “political
funds” for the military elite, the residents of North Kyongsang Province (the home of the
military rulers) in casting supportive votes on election days, and the alumni of the province’s
prominent high schools in promoting pro-government sentiments among the population. The
resources and opportunities paid to such loyal support groups involved the channeling of
strategic resources—loans from state-controlled banks and state-guaranteed foreign loans—to
the chaebol groups, the concentration of industrial centers in the favored region, the monopoly of
governmental and military posts by the alumni of schools in the region, and so on. The efficiency
of the strategic allocation of resources and opportunities thus became significantly
compromised.
These were the major venues through which the military rulers unilaterally made and
implemented policies for civil matters in the larger society. Education policies, like economic
policies, were generated through the same venues and, as in the case of the economic policies,
followed by a huge expansion in education as well as serious structural problems.
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Statist Policies and Structural Educational Problems
Statist Education Policies
The military elite’s concern about the security and legitimation of power was apparent
in their policy to control educational institutions. The purpose of this policy was to prevent and
suppress resistance to their power and to garner support. To this end, they sought to ensure that
all educational institutions, public or private, as well as the teaching staff, operated as
instruments to carry out their decisions. The measures taken for this included the legal
stipulation of educational institutions as “public institutions” in the case of public schools, and
as “public legal bodies” in the case of private schools, and all teachers as “public agents in the
field of education.” With this legal arrangement, the military elite controlled major spheres of all
educational institutions’ operation: institutional licenses, student quotas, student selection, the
curriculum and textbooks, examinations and tests, employment and management of the
teaching personnel, and even day-to-day operation. Especially notable was the policy of uniform
instruction ensured by one common curriculum for all schools and the textbooks which were
either written by the state or approved according to given specifications. Such textbooks
supplied a “right” answer to each question or issue to be dealt with in classrooms.
The developmental legitimation project also bore upon education policies. When Pag’s
junta developed this project in 1961, it did not consider education to be a strategically important
field. The attainment of full participation in primary education in the late 1950s had already
secured a sufficient number of educated workers for the low-tech industrialization in pursuit
(Cho 1994, 101n). Since available resources fell too short for the developmental legitimation
project (which was to be launched in eight years after the destructive Korean War, 1950-1953), it
was undesirable that education drained too much of them. On this judgment, the junta decided,
for the time being, to freeze educational finance at a lowest possible level and prevent potential
pressures for increased state funding for education. The policy it thus adopted was reduction in
the supply of student places at the levels of secondary and higher education. It froze school
licenses, cut down on student quotas, and downsized the existing education programs of schools
and universities in order to make them “small in size but good in quality” (Lee IY 1996). Such
developmental education policies took immediate effects in the forms of intensified entrance
competition (especially at lower secondary education), popular outcry against “the school’s high
threshold,” and disputes over the fairness of student selection procedures.6
Here, the junta turned to the egalitarian policy venue. It introduced a state entrance
examination for each level of schooling and instructed all educational institutions to admit
students according to the scores from the state examination. The latter indeed assured of a sense
of procedural fairness in student selection but, simultaneously, it made entrance competition a
major educational problem. Since all students who wanted to advance to the next level of
schooling had to write the once-a-year examination, this examination activated a nationwide
competition for higher scores, and the latter invited inter-school competitions for more
successful graduates in the state examination. The situation worsened so quickly that, by 1966,
Pag’s (now) government had rescinded its original downsizing policy and allowed for a moderate
rise in student quotas (Table 1) while tightly controlling tuition fees in order to allay parental
discontent. These egalitarian measures, however, fell far short of addressing the growing
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problem. In 1968, therefore, the government decided to drastically increase student quotas and
school licenses at the level of lower secondary education, where entrance competition was
fiercest, and began to allocate more funds to this level of schooling in order to increase the
number of schools. Then, it switched the focus of quota and license control to the next level of
schooling: upper secondary education.
Table 1
University Enrolments During the Early Pag Years
1961

1963

State universities
33,472
Private universities 82,033
Total
133,709

30,223
82,739
105,238

1965
25,964
79,679
105,643

1967

1969

26,893
97,136
124,029

32,265
100,665
132,930

Source: KEDI (1997b), pp. 171.
Through the remaining military years, state intervention in the supply and demand of
student places alternated between, and often straddled, developmental and egalitarian policy
venues. The former always led to the containment of educational expansion and, therefore,
restrictions on student quotas and new school licenses, while the latter persistently escalated
entrance competition. Here, the uniformity of instruction supplied a common ground for the
examination competition. Moreover, the state’s concern about the state entrance examination as
an efficient and fair devise for ranking aspirants of admission established a principle that its
questions should be prepared exclusively from within the uniform textbooks. Entrance
competition, thus, became a highly technical matter of who remembered more of what was
written in the textbooks. The schools which got swept in the competition taught students to
memorize textbooks and ranked and re-ranked them through repeated tests, thus turning them
against each other and alienating underachievers. Entrance competition quickly expanded
beyond the school gate to after-school cramming classes and home tutoring. When, thus, it
engulfed the entire nation, the demand for more and higher education soared up, for the
competitive atmosphere both inside and outside the school continually coerced students, even
those with no serious interest in advanced learning, to partake in it and move toward higher
levels in schooling.7 And when, as in 1968, the aggravating competition inflamed a social crisis,
the state decided to drastically raise the supply of student places at the troubled level of schooling,
thus switching entrance competition to the next level of schooling.
As a result of alternating or straddling such policy venues, secondary and higher
education grew rapidly. Between 1960 and 1990, the number of schools increased 2.4 times in
lower secondary education, 2.6 times in upper secondary education, and 4.2 times in higher
education. Meanwhile, student enrolment grew more quickly: 4.8 times, 9.2 times, and 19.0 times
respectively (data from Kim CC and Lee CJ 1994, 61). In 1990, thus, participation rate at those
levels of schooling became respectively 99.8 percent, 95.7 percent, and 46.0 percent (data from
MOE 1998). From the perspective of political economy, however, such a speedy expansion of
education prepared serious structural problems.
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Structural Problems
(1) Financial problems. The most serious problem was related to the soaring numbers
of schools and students, which directly challenged the policy makers who pursued to contain
educational expansion in order to prevent pressure for additional financial responsibility. The
ever-intensifying entrance competition and the rising demand for more and higher levels of
education made it inevitable for them to permit educational expansion and, thus, prompt the
pressures for increased state funding. As suggested by the above figures, the students enrolled in
middle schools doubled during the thirty years while those in high schools and universities
quadrupled and quintupled respectively. Since the schools’ revenues were restricted by the state’s
tuition fee control and low education funding, the infrastructure of educational institutions
deteriorated quickly (see Table 2). The state initially attempted to address this problem by
inducing additional investment from the owners of private institutions (where the infrastructure
was much worse) but in vain. The owners did not have the money and would not spend it for
their schools even if they had it, for reasons that will be presented shortly. Here, the state chose
to transfer the burden to the parents by gradually increasing tuition fees. But this policy could
not persist indefinitely.8 From 1980 on, therefore, the military government began to increase its
education budget until its size hit a peak in 1993 at 23.4 percent of the total state budget (MOE
1997, 870).9
Table 2
The Deteriorating Educational Infrastructure during the Pag Years

Students
Students per professor
(State universities)
(Private universities)
Library items
Building space per student (m2)
(State universities)
(Private universities)

1965

1970

1975

105,643
19.9
(13.7)
(23.4)
N/A
15.2
(19.1)
(14.0)

146,414
18.8
(13.3)
(21.1)
33.2
14.3
(15.6)
(13.9)

208,986
20.7
(16.2)
(22.6)
30.7
12.3
(10.4)
(13.0)

1980
403,989
27.9
(24.6)
(28.7)
23.0
11.5
(11.5)
(11.4)

Source: KEDI (1997b), pp. 171, 173, 175, and 184-5.
Considering the large defense budget and the increasing demand for welfare programs,10
it was fair to say that the military government, by 1993, had come to spend for education up to
the limit of its available resources. By that year, however, parental financial burden also had
reached a peak: 58.4 percent of the total operation cost of all schools and universities (Koh 1998,
26),11 plus a sum of after-school cramming fees which well exceeded the total operation cost of
all schools and universities (Kong and Paeg 1994). In other words, the parents paid directly out
of their pocket at least 1.6 times of the money spent for operating the entire school system while
the state, on its own, committed to educational financing as much as it could.
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(2) Dependence on entrance competition and low-cost educational programs. Another serious
problem was that more money had to be spent for education outside the formal educational
institutions than inside, and this entirely at parental burden. The principal cause of this problem
was of course the intense entrance competition which drove students to after-school cramming
classes. Were there no intense entrance competition, the huge sums of cramming fees would be
unnecessary. Logically, the problem was not hard to solve. Since the intense entrance
competition was caused by the education policies of seeking uniformity of education and
containing educational expansion, the problem would vanish if the state stopped such policies.
Such a simple solution, nevertheless, was unavailable to the military rulers because their political
interest required the maintenance of power by uniform instruction and its developmental
legitimation project. While the former laid a common ground for the nationwide competition,
the latter dictated the minimization of educational expenses by keeping student places in short
supply. In this sense, it is fair to say that the security and legitimation of power necessitated the
intense entrance competition.
More important to note, however, is that educational institutions became dependent
on the intense entrance competition. While the state’s student quota and tuition fee control,
together with curricular and textbook control, restricted the freedom and autonomy of
education, entrance competition and the subsequently rising demand for education, on the other
hand, guaranteed student supply and, thereby, tuition fee-generated revenues. Although such
revenues were limited, they allowed the institutions to run education programs without or with
insufficient state funding if only they did not spend more than absolutely necessary. The schools
and universities thus settled in a low-cost mode of operation. The schools widely practiced rote
learning and drill in the uniform textbooks and testing and ranking students in preparation for
the state entrance examination, and this in classrooms equipped and staffed minimally.
University instruction, on the other hand, was widely perceived to be superficial. This mode of
operation provoked complaints neither from the schools, where every student was driven by
entrance competition, nor from the universities, where all students had already had “enough
study.” Moreover, this mode of operation became increasingly profitable as the cyclical entrance
competition crises compelled the state to increase student quotas and tuition fees. The
guaranteed supply of students, thus, deprived educational institutions of the incentives for
improving, and ability to improve, educational quality through mutual competition for new
students.
The entire system of education thus came to turn on the single hinge of entrance
competition. And the state policies which provoked entrance competition gradually became part
and parcel of the institutionalized network of a statist political economy—“a concrete set of
institutionalized channels” (Evans 1992)—in which they sustained themselves despite, actually
thanks to, repeated “education reforms.”
(3) Private and public education. A third structural problem concerned the incorporation of
private education into the public system. Private education has been defended in North America
in light of consumer choice. The typical argument for this was that where public education
served the population as a whole, the consumers ought to have alternative venues in their pursuit
of education. Also, North American advocates pointed out that private education allowed for
the freedom of dissentient educational practices outside the public system. An important point
in the political economy perspective, however, was that it helped public education by reducing
the state’s financial and other burdens for education, for more students in private education
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meant less in public education. Private education in this sense was a safety valve to the financial
stress under which the state provided education. In South Korea, however, statist policies have
obliterated private education while keeping private schools and universities under private
ownership. The state’s uniform control of education deprived private schools and universities of
autonomy and independence and turned those institutions to pseudo-public institutions, or
“institutions of public education” (konggyoyuggigoan). Financially, this meant an additional burden
on the state side, because the difference between the tuition fee-generated revenues and the
reasonable cost of operation (including profits in one form or another) had to be paid out by the
state given that the latter set limits on revenues. From the 1980s, therefore, the government
began to fund private schools and, by 1993, it had come to defray 70.6 percent of the operation
cost in lower secondary education and 42.5 percent in upper secondary education. Meanwhile, it
paid public schools only 77.4 percent of the operation cost in lower secondary education and
78.0 percent in upper secondary education (Koh 1998, 28). Apparently, here, the state brought
private education into the public sphere at the expense of public education.
This caused another financial trouble. Since full participation was attained at both
levels of secondary education, it would now be hard for the state to sidestep the pressure to
equalize funding for private and public schools and, furthermore, to offer full funding to both
types of school. The actual financial impact of this pressure was extraordinarily great, because, in
1993, private schools accommodated 24.5 percent of all students in lower secondary education
and between 58.4 percent and 66.3 percent of the students in upper secondary education (Ibid.).
The potential pressure for increased state funding was much greater at the level of higher
education. While 83 percent of the students in higher education were enrolled in private
institutions, state grants for such institutions accounted for less than 2 percent of their operation
cost.
(4) The personalist ethic. The prevailing personalist ethic was also a problem in the
educational system, for it wasted, through corruption, a large portion of financial resources
allotted to public and private schools. Financial irregularities in private schools and universities
were frequent despite, or because of, state supervision and control. Efficiency in the state’s
management of school and university licenses was also impaired by the personalist ethic. When
the state decided to raise student quotas and new school and university licenses, for instance, the
benefit was often distributed via personal connections. As a result, some institutions received
additional student quotas and approval of new programs even though they did not possess
necessary infrastructures. As well, licenses were often issued to those who did not have
resources necessary for opening a school or university and even to those with no experience in
education.12 Thus, the personalist ethic contributed to the decline of quality while educational
expansion was rapidly in progress.
By 1993, the structural problems had deteriorated to such a degree that many South
Koreans considered their educational system to be in a major crisis. In that year, the military
government was replaced by President Kim Yong Sam’s civilian government. Also in that year,
globalization became a burning issue among the debaters on education reform as well as among
policy makers. Naturally, the debaters and the policy makers both considered the structural
problems of education in light of how to cope with the new environment created by
globalization and civilian democracy.
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Globalization and Inability to Reform
Structural Problems and Responses to Globalization and Civilian Democracy
As summarized earlier, the themes brought up with respect to the relationship between
globalization and national educational systems are two: (1) that the nation state now has to
restructure the educational system to reduce its own role in education by employing such reform
measures as liberalization, decentralization and privatization, and (2) that, nevertheless, it has to
prepare a well-trained, flexible and versatile workforce by reinforcing primary and secondary
education and, at the same time, secure a cadre of highly-trained professionals by improving
quality in higher education. Generally, these themes were also addressed by South Korean
debaters on the needs and directions of education reform at the time of restoring civil
democracy and grappling with globalization (Kim and Jung 1994). In spite of the diversity of the
views they advanced from different angles, the debaters shared a common opinion that the
existing educational system needed a large-scale overhaul if it was to be viable in the new age.
The frequently-employed grounds for this common opinion were roughly three: (1) that the
existing educational system had evolved through the military years and, for this reason, stifled
educational actors’ free initiatives; (2) that the rapid educational expansion had degraded
educational quality at all levels of schooling; and (3) that the imminent opening of South Korea’s
education market to the globalizing world would jeopardize the future of the educational
institutions settling in the complacency of low-cost, low-quality mode of operation on
guaranteed student supply. It was also pointed out that the entrance competition-dependent
schools and universities did not supply adequate manpower to the business community which
now had to compete with foreigners on their own home ground. This idea led to a
widely-supported view that the overly state-controlled educational system had to be
“democratized,” “liberalized,” and “decentralized” (Ibid.). The objectives of this envisioned
education reform were clearly to diversify educational activities and, thereby, cope with the
growing pressure for increased state funding, to eliminate entrance competition based on the
uniformity of the curriculum and textbooks, to revitalize private education, and to have a system
of education that was to be operated rationally, not along personalist connections.
The first civilian President Kim Yong Sam, 1993-1998, incorporated this view into his
political platforms. During his 1992 election campaign, he promised to employ “epoch-making
and revolutionary” measures to liberalize and decentralize the educational system, to solve the
entrance competition question, and to upgrade educational facilities and performances to the
global standards (segehoa). Then, in 1994, he appointed reform-minded educationalists to a
Presidential Commission on Education Reform (PCER) with a mandate to develop policies for
the promised education reform.
The environment was even more favorable to this type of education reform in 1998
when the next President Kim Dae Jung took over in the wake of the November 1997 financial
meltdown. (His government remained in charge until 2003.) The immediate cause of that crisis
was the sudden pullout of transnational funds, which shook hard the state-controlled financial
institutions and, subsequently, the chaebol groups which relied on favorable loans from those
financial institutions. The crisis aroused an even stronger public opinion for economic and
educational reforms aiming to terminate the statist political economy which, by excessive state
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control, obstructed development of a free market economy and deprived the economic actors of
market competitiveness. Kim Dae Jung, therefore, promised a thorough education reform, of
which goals remained the same: liberalization, decentralization, segehoa, and the termination of
entrance competition.
Negative Internal Conditions
In spite of such a favorable environment, however, the reform measures which the
civilian governments employed did not bring significant changes to the existing educational
system. The most important reason for this was their obvious underestimation of the magnitude
of promised reforms. Liberalization meant that excessive state control of education would be
withdrawn and the educational actors—schools and universities, teachers and professors, and
students and their parents—would be allowed to operate freely and responsibly.
Decentralization implied the transfer of power from the central authority to local residents.
Finally, the termination of entrance competition meant the abolition of established state policies
to control the curriculum and textbooks, student selection, tuition fees and student quotas, and
the state entrance examination. Employing such measures meant a Copernican turn from a
statist political economy to a political economy based on the educational actors’ free and
responsible initiatives. The internal conditions did not permit such drastic measures, however.
First and foremost to note, the governments of the civilian leaders were not literally
“civilian” by the nature of their power basis. The military elite’s effort to build supportive groups
and regions along the traditional personalist ethic had tremendous impact upon South Korean
voters. By the time the military elite relinquished their rule, South Koreans were divided into
antagonistic groups and regions on the basis of what they called sarcastically “group egoism”
(chibdan igijuyi) and “regional egoism” (chiyog igijuyi), so much so that neither of the two civilian
leaders was able to garner a nationwide support. They both managed to gain power by coalition
with the influential military factions, each with its own group and regional support bases. Kim
Yong Sam, the politician from the South Kyongsang Province received endorsement from the
voters in his province and the urban middle class. He grasped power by allying with Ro Tae Wu
of the second-generation military group supported by the North Kyongsang Province and Kim
Chong Pil of the first-generation military group supported by Chungchong Provinces. When
Kim Chong Pil broke with Kim Yong Sam, Kim Dae Jung, who was supported by Cholla
Provinces and the urban lower classes, worked out with him a “power-sharing” agreement
(kongdongjongguon). The heterogeneous constituencies within the power groups, and the
complicated regional and group affiliations, practically forbade reforms which were injurious to
the interests vested in the status quo.
The civilian leaders’ weak power bases, on their own, had restrictive effects on
available policy options. Although their power was obtained through fair electoral processes and
did not generate disputes about legitimacy, their failure to draw nationwide support made it
inevitable for them to continue with the developmental mobilization strategy, egalitarian policy
measures,13 and oppressive measures where necessary.
There was another stumbling block. The years of state policies to control and manage
education had left a huge body of bureaucrats. The ending of military rule released the
bureaucrats from the tight grips of governmental leaders. Moreover, the civilian leaders’ lack of
experience in running the state apparatus gave rise to the bureaucrats’ importance in policy
making and implementation. The bureaucrats took advantage of all this in their effort to
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maintain their own interest vested in big offices with ample resources and power. They
obstructed the employment of such reform ideas as liberalization and decentralization by
exhibiting reluctance to cooperate (pokjibudong, “lying with face down and making no
movement”) and, at opportune times, by manipulating the policy making processes in order to
filter reform ideas to policies suitable for their own interest by maintaining or further enhancing
state control and management. The bureaucrats thus began to intercept in the state-education
relationship to the effect of holding educational policy making and implementation within the
existing statist political economy. And such efforts easily found endorsement from the
educational institutions and their teaching staff equally dependent on the guaranteed supply of
students under the entrance competition-hinged educational system.14
Gradually, thus, such internal conditions shifted the themes of education reform
debate from liberalization, decentralization, and so on, to a reform that would enhance
educational performances—in particular, “quality, excellence and the nation’s
competitiveness”— within the existing arrangement but with enhanced state intervention and
financial commitment (Kim and Jung 1994; Kim KS 1997). After all, it was now argued,
education was “public by nature” (kyoyug-yi konggongsong) and the state’s extensive and intensive
intervention in education was a prerequisite for the integrity of the educational system. The
influence of such negative internal conditions becomes clear upon examining the two civilian
governments’ policies on entrance competition.
Entrance Competition Policies
(1) Maintaining Entrance Competition. When appointed in 1994, PCER members
understood liberalization, decentralization and the revival of free educational initiatives as
necessary reform measures to solve the entrance competition question and rearranging the
educational system for the new era of globalization.15 They generally perceived that the entrance
competition question originated from the military governments’ extensive and intensive control
of education and unsuccessful efforts to manage the supply and demand of student places.
Therefore, in their view, the question would easily banish in the civilian era if educational
activities were diversified by means of liberalization, and so on. But the “New Educational
System,” which the PCER laid down in its official report after a year of work with Ministry of
Education bureaucrats and other interested parties, demonstrated substantial modifications to
those members’ original views (PCER 1995).
Basically, the PCER Report maintained that the new age into which South Korea was
entering was going to be one of “a great turning point in the history of civilization,” in which the
industry-guided world would become one dominated by information and new knowledge. From
this outlook, it observed that an education reform that was in pursuit had to aim to endorse the
nation’s economic prosperity in the new age by rectifying the structural problems of the existing
educational system. As such structural problems, it pointed to entrance competition and such
related problems as:
• rote learning and drill in fragmentary knowledge which wiped out creativity and diversity
from classroom; superficial instruction in schools and universities;
• heavy parental financial burden for after-school cramming classes (the cost of which in 1994,
according to the Report, accounted for 5.8 percent of the gross national product in
comparison with the state’s education budget which remained at 3.8 percent),

15

Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12

• the state’s uniform control of education which restricted the educators’ professional
autonomy, and
• disappearance of moral character from the students (referring to the selfishness of students
engaged in entrance competition). (Ibid., 11-4)
The Report thus brought up some key structural problems in relation to the entrance
competition question. However, its approach to solving the problems did not differ from that of
the previous military era. It stated that entrance competition was caused by the simple fact that
student places were in short supply as evident in “the bottleneck phenomenon at university
gates” (Ibid., 13). As the cause was simple, so was the solution: widen the narrow university gates
by increasing student quotas and new university licenses until supply met demand. Once supply
met demand, the PCER Report predicted, entrance competition and after-school cramming
practice would disappear altogether and schools would return to their “normal” operation (Ibid.,
101-7). This was exactly what the policy makers of military regimes had been saying whenever
they decided to increase the supply of student places at times of crisis.
It is here to be noted that the PCER’s policy making, as reflected in its Report,
followed the venues established by the military elite—egalitarian and developmental. In the
egalitarian venue, it recommended the increase of student quotas, new university licenses, and
increased state funding of education. In the developmental venue, however, it sought to
maintain the system of state-imposed student quotas, to contain new school licenses, to keep
uniformity of the curriculum and textbook and the institution of annual state entrance
examination. It only sought to “mend” the institution for improved efficiency through a
newly-created National Institute of Educational Evaluation (KIEE). Given that such policies
would not stop entrance competition, the PCER now turned to the egalitarian venue and
recommended to suppress private cramming by resorting to the 1980 law of the Chon military
junta, and to offer free state cramming services via a satellite television network (which was to be
established exclusively for that purpose) in order thus to alleviate parental financial burden. In
either of the two venues, the institutions of state control of education became reinforced by new
institutions and increased funds in the hands of bureaucrats.
The effects of implementing PCER recommendations were what had actually
happened repetitively during the military years: persistent entrance competition, further
expansion of education, and further enhanced pressure for increased state funding for
education. By 1998, thus, the total of student quotas in higher educational institutions had grown
to the capacity of accommodating 94 percent of the year’s high school graduates. The
institutions of higher education, however, managed to attract only 84 percent of them (Kim KS
1999).
(4) Extending Entrance Competition to Graduate Schools. The surplus of student places
created new problems for policy makers to deal with. Since the high participation rate in higher
education was due to the drive toward universities and colleges triggered by intense entrance
competition, the students who managed to enter one such institution included many who could
not remain there due to financial reasons.16 The student places vacated by such students were
filled with those transferred from other universities. Here, most students in less popular
universities continued to look for opportunity to move to a more popular university. Thus, the
over-supply of student places inflamed an unprecedented crisis for the universities which had
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been relying on the student supply guaranteed by entrance competition. In reaction, the PCER
in 1997 devised a policy agenda for “research-focused, graduate school-centered universities”
(yongu-jungjom taehaguon-jungshim taehag) (PCER 1995, 23).
The underlying ideas of this program were three-fold. The first was that since
large-scale increases in student quotas and new licenses did not bring entrance competition to a
halt due to the popular preference of the top universities in the hierarchy, the PCER felt it
necessary to close those top universities’ undergraduate programs or to reduce their student
quotas to a degree of “near closure.” Instead, second, it felt that those universities should be
transformed to “research-focused, graduate school-centered universities” while other
universities were guided to concentrate their effort on teaching undergraduate students. Finally,
the state should provide the research-focused, graduate school-centered universities with
massive funding in order to transform them to very attractive (“world-class”) research
universities. In the PCER’s developmental perspective, this would ensure the supply of
high-quality research personnel for the country’s competitive performance in the global
economy. In its egalitarian perspective, it would “extend” entrance competition to graduate
programs and thus sustain the supply of students for the troubled undergraduate programs of
middle- to low-ranking universities.
The subsequent Kim Dae Jung government has taken over this program and
implemented it with a new name, “Brain Korea 21" (or “BK21”). In doing so, it also followed
the military elite’s footsteps on the road to mass education at the level of graduate studies.

The Viability of the Statist Educational System
The foregoing analysis shows the difficulties of changing a national educational system
that has been established during the decades of statist political economy.17 The policy makers of
the civilian governments understood that their nation’s prosperity in an era of globalization
depended on having a viable educational system and, for this, it was essential to liberalize and
decentralize the existing educational system. The process of policy making, however, guided
them to policy measures which maintained the existing educational system and left its structural
problems unaddressed.
What remains to be examined, then, is how the unresolved structural problems would
bear upon South Korea’s economic future. South Korea cannot go ahead with the current
educational system if it desires educational endorsement of continual economic prosperity.
Note, in the first place, that participation in higher education is now almost full and, in addition,
the policy to extend entrance competition to graduate schools will stimulate demand for
education in those institutions. Full participation in higher education suggests either of two
possible scenarios: that the nation’s workforce will soon consist entirely of university- or junior
colleges-trained professionals, or that many higher educational institutions will actually be
producing non- or semi-professional workers instead of professional workers. The former
means serious manpower shortage in the industries demanding non-professional workers;18 the
latter, on the other hand, implies the waste of precious financial resources. There is one more
problem. If the observation is correct that ICT triggers perpetual innovation in the workplace,
then the vitality of the workforce will rest on the periodic reeducation and retraining of workers
by the institutions which deal with new knowledge and technology: universities and colleges.

17

Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 13 No. 12

However, the method of selecting students by ranking applicants in terms of how much they
know about what high schools now teach will prevent most currently-employed workers from
reeducation and retraining at the level of higher education. Therefore, those workers will be
quickly invalidated by the perpetual innovation.
Financial problems are an even more serious concern. In 1997, according to OECD
(2000, 32), the total expenditure of South Korea’s educational institutions, including state funds
and parental expenses (yet excluding after-school cramming fees), was the highest of all OECD
nations in terms of its proportion in the gross domestic product (GDP): 7.4 percent. In 2000,
according to Bank of Korea estimation, the state’s education budget alone accounted for 5.7
percent of the GDP (KEDI 1997a, 59). Even so, however, educational institutions remain very
much under funded. Compulsory education is still limited to six years in primary schools except
in some rural areas where it also covers additional three years in middle schools. Compulsory
education of such a short time span, none the less, is not free. 3 percent of public primary
schools’ operation cost (in governmental statistics and no less than 10 percent in reality) is
collected from parents. Moreover, in urban centers, as many as 1,000 public school classes
operate on a two-shift basis. Meanwhile, state grants to private institutions of higher education
still covers less than 3 percent of their operation cost. Higher education being practically
universal, and graduate programs attracting more and more students, the pressure for the state’s
increased financial commitment will become much higher from now on than ever before.
Parental financial burden, meanwhile, has already gone well beyond a tolerable level.
These problems alone, aside from other equally serious problems, would be sufficient
to warrant a prediction that when globalization progresses further, the current educational
system will not be viable in terms of ensuring the continuity of public education and of
producing a flexible and versatile workforce and a cadre of highly-trained professionals. Only
one solution seems workable: a big surgery on the statist educational system by means of a
substantial degree of liberalization, decentralization, and the emancipation of private education
as the PCER members originally contemplated. South Korea, however, cannot go for the
solution because of the entrenched statist political economy of education—for the time being, at
least.

Notes
1. Depending on the discursive context, it may also refer to a political concept or “a functional
logic of political membership” (Kvistad 1999). Political economy is the way in which the political
state deals with the economic sphere of civil society. In his Laws of Ecclesiastical Society (1593),
which is perhaps the earliest English document to distinguish the political state from civil
society, Richard Hooker wrote, “The state is not identified with civil society . . . Civil society is
the organization of production in society; the state is not the organization of that production, it
is the product of the relation between political economy and society” (cited in Krader 1976, 21).
2. On his reading of Schoppa’s work, Green (1997, 24) observes that “Anglophone countries’
neo-liberal dogmas of free market economy [which prevail the global economy and liberalization
of education] run against the bedrock opposition in [East Asian] countries which have strong
traditions of state regulation, social partnership and corporatist planning.” He mistakes Japan to
be Germany and “patterned pluralism” to be social partnership. Schoppa says that in Japan not
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only interest groups such as the Japan Teachers Union (Nikkyoso) but also political parties with
representation in the Diet are left out of policy making processes.
3. This may suggest that statism in East Asia is a modern version of the old mode of government
dubbed “Asiatic despotism” rather than an imported political economy. Whether this name is
fair or not, the state’s overwhelming status in relation to society is still apparent. In the Chinese,
Japanese and Korean languages, “the state” (kuojia, kokka and kugga, “the king’s family”) can
substitute “the nation” (kuomin, kokumin and kugmin, “the king’s subjects”), but not the other way
round. In the contemporary use, the word for “the nation” is equated with “the members of a
nation” or “the citizens” but not vice versa. The members of a nation and the citizens both
remain subject to and cared for by the state, which is the same as the nation. Whether or not the
speakers of those languages are aware, their discourse on the state-society relationship must be
affected by the semantic linkages of the words.
4. A good example of this is the system of frequently rotating bureaucrats from one office to
another. This rotation system was initiated by the military elite who feared the bureaucrats’
independence. But Amsden (1989) observes that South Korea’s economic development under
the military regimes was due to the bureaucrats’ enlightened leadership. Her observation is
apparently shortsighted.
5. For the “personalist ethic,” see Dore (1982) and Chang (1991). For a critical response, see
Kim KS (1999).
6. Seth (1997) observes that developmental policies were not thoroughly enforceable because of
the demand from the social forces of “teachers, school officials, private foundations, and
especially parents” for equitable distribution of educational opportunity in secondary and higher
education.
7. For analysis of the relationship between state intervention, entrance competition and the
rising demand for education, see Kim KS (1999) and Koh (1998, 33-63).
8. Parental educational expenditure rose from 64,350 million won in 1966 to 251,288 million
won in 1970 and to 458,305 million won in 1975 (Kim YB 1980, 263).
9. The state’s education budget fluctuated between 14.4 and 18 percent in its total budget during
the Pag years (1961-1979), and between 18.6 and 22.8 percent during the Chon-Ro years
(1980-1992) (Ibid., 821). Although the economy grew fast, educational expansion made the cost
of education grow much faster. From 1970 to 1998, the GDP grew 164 times while the cost of
education, including governmental and parental portions, rose 221 times. “Kyoyugbi nyongan
chichul 25-jowon, GDP-yi 5.7 posentu,” Dongailbo, 14 February 2000.
10. The defense budget was similar in size to the education budget. Due to the growing pressure,
the Chon government introduced Workmen’s Compensation Insurance, Medical Insurance, and
National Pension Insurance. For these programs, in 1987, the state spent merely 2.19 percent of
the GDP. See Lee HK (1999, 29).
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11. In 1997, a new student in Seoul paid $1,073 in Canadian currency in both public and private
middle schools, $1,882 in both public and private high schools, $7,202 in a state university’s
science faculty, and $11,482 in a private university’s science faculty (MOE 1997, 870).
12. In 2000, for instance, 24 university licenses and 15 junior college licenses did not materialize
as operating institutions. “Pobinman mandullgo mun an yon taehag 39 kot,” Chosunilbo, 3
October 2000.
13. During President Kim Yong Sam’s term, for instance, the state’s welfare expenditures grew
from 3.5 percent of the GDP in 1992 to 4.47 percent in 1996 (Lee HK 1999, 34).
14. Most schools and universities opposed changes to the existing educational system. Vocal in
the opposition was teachers and professors. When abolishing the state entrance examination
became an issue in 1998, for instance, a professor of education at a private university in Seoul
wrote, “Should the state abolish the examination, it would have to tell universities how to select
students.” Reference is withheld to protect identity.
15. I interviewed three key members of the PCER in 1994 when they were exploring a general
direction of education reform.
16. The number of such students at state universities was 102,937 in 1998. This figure accounts
for a third of those universities’ student quotas. “Hyuhagsaeng chungga kyoyugjaejong abbag,”
Hankyoreh, 17 October 2000.
17. After examining the economic reforms seeking “liberalization” and “deregulation,” J.A.
Matthews (1998, 757) concludes, “South Koreans have no intention of replacing their former
highly interventionist model of development with an Anglo-American style non-interventionist
economy based on unfettered market forces.”
18. While participation rate in higher education grew rapidly, manpower supply to the industry
decreased quickly. In 1980, participation rate in higher education was 16.2 percent and the
manufacturing sector felt 3.46 percent short of necessary manpower. In 1990, the participation
rate reached 48.8 percent and the manufacturing sector’s manpower shortage surged to 6.85
percent (Kang 1996).
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